How Much Independent Judicial Research Is Appropriate? by Gorman, Wayne K.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Court Review: The Journal of the American 
Judges Association American Judges Association 
2016 
How Much Independent Judicial Research Is Appropriate? 
Wayne K. Gorman 
Provincial Court of Newfoundland and Labrador, wgorman@provincial.court.nl.ca 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/ajacourtreview 
Gorman, Wayne K., "How Much Independent Judicial Research Is Appropriate?" (2016). Court Review: The 
Journal of the American Judges Association. 583. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/ajacourtreview/583 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the American Judges Association at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Court Review: The Journal of 
the American Judges Association by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - 
Lincoln. 
Footnotes
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3. See Agar v. Weber, 2014 BCCA 297, 2014 CarswellBC 2129, ¶ 38
(Can. B.C.).
4. See R. v. Brijeski, 40 M.V.R. (3d) 251, 1999 CarswellOnt 675, ¶ 3
(Can. Ont.).
5. [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1197 (Can.).
6. Id. ¶ 33.
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8. 2015 ONCA 827, 2015 CarswellOnt 18304, ¶ 18 (Can. Ont.)
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9. 27 M.P.L.R. (4th) 193, 2005 CarswellOnt 7422, ¶ 13 (Can. Ont.).
10. 2015 BCCA 28, 2015 CarswellBC 126 (Can. B.C.).
11. Id. ¶ 6.
12. Id. ¶ 8.
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It is generally accepted that judges can conduct researchbeyond the materials provided by counsel. One cannotargue, for instance, that we are limited to case precedents
submitted by counsel or that we cannot conduct our own legal
research.1 However, what if the research is not of a strictly legal
nature? What if we are not satisfied with the evidence pre-
sented? How far can we go in examining exhibits and drawing
conclusions from them? These are different and more difficult
questions that have caused debate in Canada and the United
States because in “an accusatory and adversarial system, the
delicate task of bringing the truth to light falls first and fore-
most to the parties.”2 As will be seen, in certain instances,
independent research or examination of exhibits can both raise
a reasonable apprehension of bias and prevent an accused per-
son from making full answer and defence.
EXAMINATION OF EXHIBITS
When an exhibit is entered, we can examine it. No doubt we
can draw inferences from the exhibit.3 A “trial judge is not a
mere observer in a criminal trial.”4 However, how far can we
go in such examinations before we become a witness?
An interesting illustration of this point can be found in the
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Nikolovski.5 In
Nikolovski, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed a conviction
for robbery based solely on the trial judge’s comparison of the
person depicted in a crime-in-progress video with the accused
who was sitting in the courtroom. There was no other identifi-
cation evidence, and the store clerk was unable to identify the
accused. The majority of the Supreme Court held that “it was
certainly open to the trial judge to conclude that the accused
before her was the person depicted on the tape.”6 However,
two dissenting justices suggested that “the difficulty with the
majority’s reasoning is that the judge’s observations [were]
entirely untested by cross-examination.”7 Applying Nikolovski,
it was held in R. v. Benson that a conviction should be upheld
though the trial judge “relied on the recognition evidence of
the complainant and his own supporting observations in mak-
ing his decision on the appellant’s guilt.”8 Similarly, in R. v.
Gyles, it was held that in convicting the accused, the trial judge
properly “relied on her comparison of the appellant’s voice
when he testified in court with the voice heard on the tape
recording [entered as an exhibit] in coming to her conclusion
that it was the appellant’s voice on the tape recording.”9
An example of a trial judge going too far in examining
exhibits can be found in R. v. Bornyk.10 In Bornyk, the accused
was charged with the offence of break and entry. The key evi-
dence against him was a fingerprint found inside the house.
The Crown called an expert fingerprint examiner, who testified
that the fingerprint had been deposited in the house by the
accused. After reserving judgment, the trial judge sent counsel
four articles critical of the accuracy of fingerprint analysis. After
hearing further submissions, the trial judge entered an acquit-
tal. In doing so he referred to the articles he had produced and
his own comparison of the known print with the latent print.
The Crown appealed from the acquittal.  The appeal raised
two issues:
(1) whether the trial judge erred “in relying upon inde-
pendently researched literature that was not properly
introduced by either party, not tested in evidence, and
not put to the fingerprint witness”; and 
(2) whether the trial judge erred “by engaging in his
own unguided comparison of the latent print and
known print.”11
The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered. The British
Columbia Court of Appeal noted that it “is basic to trial work
that a judge may only rely upon the evidence presented at trial,
except where judicial notice may be taken.”12 The Court of
Appeal indicated that it was “apparent from the excerpts found
in the reasons for judgment and the descriptive titles of the
articles uncovered by the judge that the articles are discussions
on the subject of fingerprint analysis, including opinion. As
articles commenting on forensic science, their contents are not
matters of which the judge could take judicial notice. It is thus
axiomatic that it was not open to the judge to embark on his
independent investigation.”13
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The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge “stepped
beyond his proper neutral role and into the fray. In doing so, he
compromised the appearance of judicial independence essential
to a fair trial. While he sought submissions on the material he
had located, by the very act of his self-directed research, in the
words of Justice Doherty in R. v. Hamilton (2004), 189 O.A.C.
90, 241 D.L.R. (4th) 490 at para. 71, he assumed the multi-
faceted role of ‘advocate, witness and judge.’”14
The Court of Appeal also concluded that the trial judge
erred in “conducting his own analysis of the fingerprints”:
[T]he judge also erred by conducting his own analysis of
the fingerprints, absent the assistance of the expert wit-
ness. The very point of having an expert witness in a
technical area, here fingerprint analysis, is that the spe-
cialized field requires elucidation in order for the court
to form a correct judgment: Kelliher (Village) v. Smith,
[1931] S.C.R. 672; R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9, 114
D.L.R. (4th) 419. While it may be desirable that a judge
personally observe the similarities and differences
between the latent point and known point, such exami-
nation should be guided by a witness so as to avoid the
trier of fact forming a view contrary to an explanation
that may be available if only the chance were provided
to proffer it.15
A recent example from New Zealand constitutes another
example of a judge going too far. In Garrett-Phillips v. R., the
accused pleaded guilty to a charge of wounding with intent to
cause grievous bodily harm.16 The accused had stabbed the
victim at a tavern and used a knife he had brought to the tav-
ern with him. At the sentence hearing, evidence was presented
to refute the suggestion that the stabbing had been premedi-
tated. This evidence indicated that, earlier in the day, the
accused had been paua fishing at Opunake, that the knife he
had with him at the tavern had been used for paua shucking,
and that, as he had not changed his clothes afterwards, that
knife was still in his pocket when he went to the tavern. 
The sentencing judge rejected this evidence. One of the
grounds upon which he did so was that he had personally
“consulted tide charts for Opunake on the day in question.”
The sentencing judge concluded based upon his assessment of
the charts that “the alleged paua fishing would have occurred
at full-tide. The judge did not, therefore, accept that Garrett-
Phillips would have been wearing the same clothes in the tav-
ern as he had worn whilst fishing for paua. Further, the judge
did not consider the knife to be the sort of knife that would be
used for paua fishing.
On appeal, the New Zealand Court of Appeal upheld the
sentence imposed but indicated that “it was unwise of the
Judge to have consulted factual material that was not in evi-
dence before him.”17
But how far should such restrictions go? Surely we are not
limited solely to judicial notice. Can we not use our experience
and knowledge of local conditions without evidence having
been presented? Consider the decision in R. v. Smarch.18 In
Smarch, the accused was convicted of the offence of sexual
assault. The trial judge refused to impose a “long term super-
vision order” because he concluded “that suitable, high-inten-
sity treatment programs were not available in the Yukon.”19
The Yukon Court of Appeal held that the foundation for the
sentence was based “on an absence of evidence, which is an
error in law. There was no evidence before the judge regarding
programs that could adequately supervise Mr. Smarch in the
community; rather, the judge based his conclusion that such
programs were available on his own knowledge and experi-
ence. This is not enough.”20
So it would appear that though we can view exhibited video
tapes or photographs and reach our own conclusions without
becoming “advocate, witness and judge,” we must be cautious
in examining other types of evidence. The line of demarcation
appears to involve, in part, whether expert explanation of the
relevance and meaning of the evidence is necessary and
whether it requires an examination that might be impacted by
cross-examination. 
THE INTERNET
The Internet allows for an unprecedented ease of worldwide
legal research. However, it also allows for non-legal research,
and this is where judges can fall into error.
An example can be found in R. v. C.D.H.21 In C.D.H., the
accused was acquitted of the offence of sexual assault. The trial
judge had conducted his own Internet research on the website
“Match.com” after it had been referred to in the evidence. The
Ontario Court of Appeal held that the trial judge’s conduct
contravened the “basic principle that judges and jurors must
make their judicial decisions based only on the evidence pre-
sented in court on the record.”22
The Ontario Court of Appeal also concluded “that the cir-
cumstances we have outlined gave rise to a reasonable appre-
hension of bias.”23
In the United States, the decision in Rowe v. Gibson24 nicely
illustrates the problem because of the existence of a dissent.
In Rowe, a prisoner sued a prison and its staff in relation to
medical treatment. The suit was dismissed but reversed on
appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. The nature of the disagreement between the judges
was described by one of the judges as follows:
A disagreement about the outcome of this relatively sim-
ple case has morphed into a debate over the propriety of
appellate courts supplementing the record with Internet
research.25
Court Review - Volume 52 5
26. Id. at 638, 641 (Hamilton, J., dissenting in part).
27. Id. at 628.
28. 2011 ONCA 193, 2011 CarswellOnt 1497, ¶ 36 (Can. Ont.).
29. See Keith D. Kilback & Michael D. Tochor, Searching for Truth But
Missing the Point, 40 ALTA. L. REV. 333, 333 (2002).
In an opinion dissenting in part, Judge David F. Hamilton
took umbrage at his colleagues’ use of the Internet:
The ease of research on the internet has given new life
to an old debate about the propriety of and limits to
independent factual research by appellate courts. . . .
The majority’s approach turns the court from a neutral
decision-maker into an advocate for one side. The
majority also offers no meaningful guidance as to how it
expects other judges to carry out such factual research
and what standards should apply when they do so.
Under the majority’s approach, the factual record will
never be truly closed. This invites endless expansion of
the record and repetition in litigation as parties contend
and decide that more and more information should have
been considered.26
However, Judge Richard A. Posner, writing for the majority,
suggested that modern trial judges are not “like the English
judges of yore”:
In citing even highly reputable medical websites in sup-
port of our conclusion that summary judgment was pre-
mature we may be thought to be “going outside the
record” in an improper sense. It may be said that judges
should confine their role to choosing between the evi-
dentiary presentations of the opposing parties, much
like referees of athletic events. But judges and their law
clerks often conduct research on cases, and it is not
always research confined to pure issues of law, without
disclosure to the parties. We are not like the English
judges of yore, who under the rule of “orality” were not
permitted to have law clerks or other staff, or libraries,
or even to deliberate—at the end of the oral argument in
an appeal the judges would state their views seriatim as
to the proper outcome of the appeal.27
CONCLUSION
The decision in Smarch might have been different if the trial
judge had raised his concern about a lack of treatment pro-
grams and asked for submissions or evidence. In R. v. Turpin,
for instance, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that if a trial
judge, in examining an exhibit, concludes it contradicts viva
voce evidence on a point not raised, the trial judge should
“advise the parties and offer an opportunity to have the trial re-
opened.”28 Such an approach might generally be wise. A crim-
inal trial is after all not really a search for the truth. It consti-
tutes “an independent testing of facts to the required legal
standard in order to determine if facts have been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.”29
Though a request for further submissions based upon an
examination of presented evidence may answer the problem of
judges becoming their own witnesses, there appears to be no
answer to a judge becoming her or his own witness by exam-
ining such evidence as fingerprints. Similarly, the competing
views expressed by the judges in Rowe simply cannot be rec-
onciled. The majority opinion proposes a wide scope for judi-
cial evidence-gathering unencumbered by disclosure or the
benefits of advocacy. 
Wayne Gorman is a judge of the Provincial
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